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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare losses deriving from centralized, uniform
levels of public provision of good and services deriving from standards set up
by a given level of government. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the
growing literature on the eﬀective outcomes of decentralization by looking at
the other side of the coin, namely at the impact of centralized provision. It
∗This paper was completed while the second author was visiting at University of York, Depart-
ment of Economics. Thanks are due to Andrew Jones. The usual disclaimers apply.
1develops a simple theoretical model and tests it with reference to public health
care provision in Italy. The evidence shows that, while levels of satisfaction
increase with income, which is a standard result of the theory, they are lower in
the poorer regions where, due to the standards, the share of income absorbed
by health care is substantially higher than in the richer regions.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes the welfare losses deriving from centralized, uniform levels of
public provision of good and services deriving from the introduction of standards set
up by a given level of government. It develops a simple theoretical model and a test
of it with reference to health care provision in Italy. The paper intends to contribute
to the growing literature on the eﬀective outcomes of decentralization by looking at
the other side of the coin, namely at the impact of centralized provision.
According to the standard literature centralization is synonymous of uniformity
of service provision and standards are the typical instrument to introduce unifor-
mity. However, according to the recent literature (Breton, 1996, Lockwood 2007)
centralized and uniform provision is, neither in principle, nor in fact a necessity.
Uniformity is rather the intended result of government action. All governments can,
a n dd oi nf a c t ,d i ﬀerentiate policies when they want to do so, but for those non rival
goods that have a area of impact which corresponds exactly to the area where they
exert their jurisdiction.
A given level of government may implement uniformity by imposing standards
onto its regional agencies (as in deconcentrated system of government), or onto lower
levels of government (as in a decentralized system). Thus uniformity is not neces-
sarily associated only with the operation of central/federal government. Uniform
standards can also be set up by lower levels of government with reference, in turn,
to their own local agencies, or their lower levels of government. This is the case of
federated states in a federation, when they set up standards applying to their local
governments. The alternative to centralization is the absence of standards, where
regional or local agencies and regional or lower levels of government, or distinct
individuals determine the level of the service they prefer.
When applied, standards result - unless preferences are the same for every citizen
3(in which case they would be useless) - in a level of service provision that is necessarily
too high for some citizens and too low for others, creating welfare losses. However,
losses are not symmetric. Citizens who prefer more than what is publicly provided
can, in most cases, address the market, or other providers, such as associations of
consumers or clubs to satisfy them. Adjustment is not feasible to those who prefer
less than what is publicly provided, since there is no way, individually, to reduce the
level of publicly provided services.
Centralization via standards may also impose costs on individuals with high
preferences. This happens when alternatives to public provision of the service are
less eﬃcient.
Welfare losses are more diﬀuse, concerning a larger number of individuals, the
wider the area of the jurisdiction that sets the standards, since as presumed by most
of the literature variation of individual preferences is correlated with the size of ju-
risdictions. Thus, nationwide standards may generate larger absolute losses than
region-wide standards. This applies to all citizens with lower than standard prefer-
ences and applies to citizens with higher preferences facing non eﬃcient alternatives
to the public provision of the service. All this implies that welfare losses may be
reduced by scaling down the size of government responsible for setting the standards.
Subsidization of losers, that is of individuals who prefer less than the chosen
standards may eliminate their welfare loss ensuring them the level of utility they
enjoyed, but at the cost for the society represented by the subsidy. In other words,
standards may reach the same result for losers as decentralization does, but with
a waste of resources. This argument has far-reaching policy implications, since it
questions the cost-eﬀectiveness of policies based on central standards cum subsidies
that are intended to protect the access to services by the poorer segments of the
population.
The paper is divided into three sections plus the conclusions. The ﬁrst section
4presents a short review of the main literature on the topic. The second section
presents the analysis. It is based on a standard model of determination of the quan-
tity of a publicly provided good in a median voter framework. Preferences for the
publicly provided good are determined by voters’ income. This may appear as a
non-necessary speciﬁcation, which restricts the generality of the analysis. Most of
the literature prefers to ascribe diﬀerences in preferences to general factors, such as
ethnicity, culture, and religion. However, most countries, particularly the industrial-
ized ones, are quite homogeneous in these terms, while income and wealth conditions
surely diﬀer and impact surely on the willingness to pay for services. The assumption
allows the derivation of some speciﬁcr e s u l t s .
The third section presents the empirical evidence. It is referred to health care
in Italy and it is based on the results of yearly surveys that report, by regions,
t h ed e g r e eo fs a t i s f a c t i o no fu s e r so fh o s p ital and medical (services). Italy has a
national health service where regional governments provide the services while the
central government determines minimum uniform standards and provides substantial
equalization grants. The degree of satisfaction is taken to represents the welfare losses
and gains. The analysis shows that, while levels of satisfaction increase with income,
which is a standard result of the theory, they are lower in the poorer regions where,
due to the standards, the share of income absorbed by health care is substantially
higher than in the richer regions.
52 Expected Outcomes of decentralization: a brief
survey of the literature
A number of papers discuss decentralization outcomes in industrial countries,1 or
provide international comparisons. A survey of the literature referring to the OECD
countries is provided by Ahmad, Brosio, and Tanzi (2008). Cross-country studies are
generally constrained by limited availability of comparable data to use a reduced-
form relationship between decentralization and eﬃciency.2 Assessments for single
countries can, potentially, overcome the control variables issue and provide ﬁrmer
results. Many studies use data from diﬀerent sources, i.e. mainly budgets, adminis-
trative sources, and increasingly household survey data.
The empirical literature on decentralization and eﬃciency can be arranged in
four distinct groups. The ﬁrst group of studies refers to decentralization and pro-
duction eﬃciency, and forms the largest group. In one of the best papers of this
group Barankay and Lockwood (2007) examine the relationship between educational
outcomes and decentralization in Switzerland. In this country responsibility for ed-
ucation has always been cantonal, although the federal government equalizes across
cantons. Cantons can devolve some of expenditure responsibilities to their local gov-
ernments and they eﬀectively do so. It is thus possible to observe diﬀerent degrees
1There are several papers on Spain, which provides excellent opportunities for testing theories
about the impact of decentralization. In fact, since the re-establishment of democracy and the Con-
stitution of 1978, Spain experienced an important process of ﬁscal decentralization, whose timing,
however, was not equal for all Autonomous Communities (AC). Some AC’s assumed devolved re-
sponsibilities earlier than others, thus allowing researchers to examine the impact of decentralization
with reference to two distinct samples: one with decentralized and the other will still centralized
responsibilities.
2The dependent variable is usually a comparable but simple indicator of policy outcomes, while
decentralization is represented by ﬁscal indicators based mostly on the relative shares of central
and sub-national governments in total national public expenditure and/or revenue
6of decentralization in education between cantons. Barankay and Lockwood show:
ﬁrst, that it is possibly to overcome most of problems associated with information
constraints and, secondly, that decentralization does in fact contribute to improve
outcomes (in their study outcomes are measured by the share of 19-year population
that passes the ﬁnal exams (Maturité) to enter University).
A second group of papers refer to preference matching that is supposed to be
the most important achievement of decentralization. Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee
(2002) provide a well-structured analysis with reference to the regulation of the
liquor sales in the US States between 1934 and 1970. In 1933 the Prohibition Act
was repealed and the States were made responsible for liquor control. States then
had the choice between centralized/state-wide regulation, and devolution of regula-
tion to their local governments (counties, municipalities and towns). Strumpf and
Oberholzer-Gee show that decentralization of regulation is observed in states with
huge heterogeneity of preferences on liquor sales, while centralization prevails with
less extreme disparities.
A third small group of papers relates decentralization to convergence of service de-
livery levels. According to the theory, decentralization should decrease convergence,
when heterogeneity of preferences and disparities of economic conditions prevail. It
is also expected that decentralization could bring convergence, particularly if accom-
panied by introduction of uniform standards and eﬀective transfers. In one of the
most interesting papers of this group Ahlin and Mörk (2007) analyze the impact on
convergence in the Swedish education sector. Sweden took three major steps to de-
centralize its education system. In 1991 formal responsibility for compulsory, upper
secondary and adult education was moved to the local government level. Teachers
were transferred to municipalities, but salaries were still determined centrally, as well
as curricula and national evaluations. In 1993, all sector speciﬁc grants, such as those
for education, health and social protection, were uniﬁed into a single block-grant,
7giving municipalities the freedom, for example, to move resources from education to
social protection (or vice versa). In 1996, teachers’ wages setting was moved to mu-
nicipalities and new block grant system was introduced, based on revenue and cost
equalization. The paper shows that no appreciable change has taken place in the
pattern of per pupil spending, while variation in teacher-pupil ratio has decreased
over time. The authors explain the surprising result (challenging traditional the-
ory) in terms of the strategic interactions between local politicians-local choices are
opposed by neighbouring municipalities’ choices.
A large number of papers examine decentralization and growth. When countries
decentralize, less developed regions fearing losing in terms of growth, with less sup-
port from the central government. This looks prima facie reasonable. At the same
time promotion of growth is one of the crucial goals pursued by local politicians.
Akai and Sakata (2007) provide good analytical and empirical analysis for the US.
They distinguish between two diﬀerent concepts/impacts of decentralization. The
ﬁrst refers to decentralization of resources. The presumable impact of decentraliza-
tion is to increase disparities among regions. Here the impact of decentralization
will arise mostly through the expenditure multiplier. The second concept refers to
decentralization as a commitment device. Decentralization occurs when sub national
governments rely on their own sources of revenue with a hard budget constraint. The
paper shows that decentralization, as a commitment device, has a signiﬁcant impact
on the reduction of regional disparities in growth. The results are conﬁrmed by
Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire (2003) with a detailed analysis of a group of ﬁve OECD
countries (Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the US) plus India.
83 The model
The following discussion is presented in as much of an intuitive guise as possible. In
fact, it is our intention in the paper to make the general model as clear as possible and
to show how the simplest of economic reasoning is suﬃcient to achieve a reasonable
understanding of the eﬀects of the outcomes of de/centralization. Naturally, the
model itself permits a formal expression as well, and in that alternative presentation
more speciﬁc results (especially of the comparative static type) can be established.
3.1 Individual preferences
Consider an economy with three jurisdictions represented by j,w h e r ej ∈ {A,B,C}.3
Regions are further subdivided into lower levels of governments. Their consideration
in this model is, however, totally redundant. They are mentioned simply to remind
the reader, that the model can be applied equally to the federal/central level and/or
to the regional level. The income of individuals in jurisdictions, y, are uniformly
distributed and diﬀer across jurisdictions by their level of aggregate income, with
mean income yA <y B <y C. Each region has the same odd number of voters.
Consequently, yB is also the national median voter.
Each individual consumes two goods: health and a numeraire good, x. Health
consumption can be measured by a single index, h, that takes into consideration
both the quantity and the quality of health. The utility function is given by
U (x,h)=U [V (x,h)] (1)
where V (x,h) is concave and homogenous of degree one in (x,h).M o r e o v e r ,
UV > 0, UVV < 0.Given these assumption it can be shown that U [V (x,h)] exhibits
diminishing marginal rate of substitution between x and h.
3The model can be easily extended to n jurisdictions where n is odd.
9The price of the numeraire good x is normalized to 1. The price of a unit of h
is denoted by p = C/n,w h e r eC is the total cost of h and n is population. Good
h is also provided by the market or by other providers at cost Cpr = C/α,w h e r e
α ∈ ]0,1[,i sa ne ﬃciency factor. When α → 0 the market is completely ineﬃcient
and there is no way of buying h on the market. When α → 1 the market tends to
be as eﬃcient as public provision: voters non satisﬁed with the level of government
provision can buy the quantity they prefer and pay for it the same price paid to the
government.
The cost of providing h is ﬁnanced through a uniform proportional tax rate, t,
levied by the central government. The total tax payment for individual is ty.T h e r e
are no other public expenditures, so tax receipts are solely used for providing h.
The government balances the budget, so that the revenues equal government costs,
ty = ph. The tax rate that balances the budget is t = ph
y, where hats stand for mean
values.
Therefore, the amount of private good consumed by individual can be expressed
as


































Altough it is analytically indemonstrable the demand of publicly provided goods
is increasing with income, because of the unpredictable relative size of the income
and price eﬀect, observation suggests that the share of GDP absorbed by publicly
10provided goods increases with the increase of GDP. Hence, following Epple and
Romano (1996) we focus on the case for which ∂M/∂y > 0 (Slope Rising in Income,
SRI). This condition may be interpreted graphically as follows. Let the budget
constraint be represented by the straight line from the origin with a slope of dt/dh =
p/y. Voters preferences are represented by indiﬀerence curves whose levels increase
as they move toward south-east (the two arguments have an opposite impact on
utility).
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2 Federal standards
Responsibility for setting the standards for h is assigned by the constitution. When
standards are assigned to the federal/central government, public provision of a good
at a uniform level is applied to the whole national jurisdiction and will be ensured
by the operation of regional agencies or by regional governments acting as agents
of the central government. The determination by each individual of the quantity of
publicly provided good takes place through a two stage decision-making process. As
in Crémer and Palfrey (2006), the national standard setting process is the ﬁrst stage
of a two stage game; the second stage is the individual adjustment via the market,
or other providers.
Solving backward, in stage 2 each individual, given the national standard, chooses
the combination (x,h) she/he intends to consume. Given the assumption, it can
be shown that the second stage of this stage corresponds to the case in which all
individuals choose their ideal combination [Crémer and Palfrey, 2000]. It is then
possible to focus on the stage 1, i.e. the national referendum where each individual



















Since alternative to public provision of public good are assumed to be ineﬃcient,
such that Cpr >C, there is no choice between public provision and the market, thus
voters have single peaked preferences and the median voter theorem applied, with
the median voter yB as the pivotal voter, whose preferred quantity is hB.
In summary, individuals who prefer high quantities declare his preferred one and
ﬁll the diﬀerence on the market. Individuals who prefer low quantities and may
presume that the standard will be higher than their preferred one, are not interested
by private provision but have no alternative than to receive hB.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,





, while the loss for the individuals (again half of total number) who
prefer more may be reduced through supplementary provision. The extent of this





provision thus impacts relatively more on the welfare of poorer voters due to their
impossibility to adjust downwards the quantity consumed and the price, in terms of
income tax, paid.
In terms of Figure 1, given a cost for the provision of h shown by the budget
line, hA and hC are the quantities preferred by the poor and the rich individuals
respectively, while hB is the quantity preferred by the median voter. The welfare
loss of poor individual is shown by the distance between the indiﬀerence curve of
the poor that corresponds to his/her preferred outcome (hAtA) and the indiﬀerence
curve that passes through the outcome chosen by the median voter outcome (hBtB).
To alleviate the welfare loss to the poor a subsidy could be paid. In Figure 1 a
subsidy equal to the distance between tA and tB in terms of reduction of the income
tax rate applied to the poor would be enough to eliminate her the welfare loss from
centralization, bringing her to the level of utility she would have if the were the
12strategic voter.
One can easily observe, however, that central standards cum subsidy to the poor
are ineﬃcient from the point of view of the society: they bring the poor to the
same level of utility she could have without the standards by imposing the cost of
the subsidy. In other words, a decentralized decision would bring the same level of
utility to the poor without to have to impose the subsidy. This abstracts from the
distribution problem originated by the ﬁnancing of the subsidy, but the ineﬃciency
will stay on even if the subsidy were ﬁnanced by some exogenous source, such as
foreign assistance
3.2.1 Sub federal standards
When regional governments are made responsible for the standards, uniformity will
prevail within their own borders, and is ensured, in turn, either by their own local
agencies, or by their local governments acting as agents.
We have now three results. The ﬁrst result is pretty standard. Downscaling the
responsibility for standards if preferences within regions are more homogenous than
between regions reduces welfare losses. If preferences were perfectly equal inside
regions welfare losses would be reduced to zero.
The second result of the analysis is less standard and more relevant. It says
that, the more inequality there is between regions the larger the gains (in terms of
smaller welfare losses) of assigning standards to lower levels of government. To see
it let’s go again to Figure 1, where the indiﬀerence curves refer now to the median
voters in each region and consider, ﬁrst, region A, whose level of good provision
will now be hA.The greater the distance from hB, the more its poor inhabitants
will gain from decentralization of standards. With enough distance - more precisely
when their distance from hA becomes smaller than their distance from hB -e v e nt h e
richest residents of A will gain from decentralization. Region B will stay the same.
13Gains and losses are more complex in region C.A l lr e s i d e n t so fC who prefer more
than hB will gain with decentralization to the extent by which private adjustment
is less eﬃcient than public provision. Residents of C who wanted less than hB will
experience an increase in their welfare loss whose size will depend from the distance
of their preferred quantity from hC. In other words, for all voters, but the poor
residents of the richer region decentralization of standards will bring beneﬁts, whose
absolute size will increase with regional inequality.
Finally, the third result is that decentralization of standards is more eﬃcient,
i.e. brings less welfare losses, the less private adjustment is eﬃcient. This is simply
because with decentralization rich regions can increase the level of publicly provided
services, while poor regions are never aﬀected by private adjustment option.
144 Empirical method
As mentioned before, the aim of the empirical analysis, which is based on Italian
data, is to understand how national standards impact on welfare losses and gains.
More speciﬁcally, assuming that the degree of satisfaction represents welfare losses
and gains, the main hypotheses to be tested is that satisfaction is inversely correlate
with the public cost of provision. Since we use aggregate data for regions we should
be able to show that the poorer the jurisdictions the lower their degree of satisfaction.
We should also show that satisfaction varies with the income of respondents.
4.1 The main traits of the Italian health care system
Italy has a national health service where regional governments are responsible for the
provision of the services, while the central government determines minimum uniform
standards — the so-called Essential Levels of Service (LEA in the Italian acronym)
and provides equalization grants aimed at bringing each region to a level of per-
capita revenue very close to that of the richest regions, notwithstanding its income
and wealth conditions. The working of the revenue system is summarized in table 1
that follows. Column 2 shows per-capita total revenue. It has to be noted that the
revenues of the richest region, Lombardy, is lower than that of the poorest region,
Calabria. Own regional taxes shown in column 3 — namely IRAP (a regional tax on
business and the regional surcharge on PIT — show a large variation moving from the
richest to the poorest regions. For example, in Lombardy they represent 60.4% of
total revenue, while this share is only 9.3 percent in Calabria. The gap between total
revenue is ﬁlled mostly by equalization grants aimed at ensuring the homogeneous
level of services among all regions. In the case of Calabria other revenue represents
more than 90 percent of revenue.
Individuals supplement publicly provided services with their own expense for
15medicines (including co-payments), dental and other specialist care and hospital
services. The share of private on public expenditure is substantial amounting to
more than twenty percent of the latter (about 2.0 percent of GDP in 2006 for private
against 6.5 percent for public) and is steadily increasing over the years.
[Table 1 about here]
4.2 Data
Complete data is available for 20 Italian regions for the period 2000-2006 and is
obtained from multiple sources. Data comes from the Annual Survey on Italian
Households (Analisi Multiscopo) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics
(Istat) as well as complementary statistical information from a web page of Italian
Ministry of Finance that contains a collection of ﬁscal information at the regional
level. Variable names and their deﬁnitions are given in Table 2, along with summary
statistics.
[Table 2 about here]
On the basis of the analytical approach, the empirical model includes information
on satisfaction, score, which are constructed on the basis, of responses to four queries
concerning of hospital services.4 Each question had answering alternatives ranging
from 1 to 4, and the merging of the two questions results in a range from 2 to 8,
score. The two queries were:
• How did you judge physician services while you were in-patient?
• How did you judge nursery services while you were in-patient?
4Missing observations on satisfaction are registered in 2004, when the Analisi Multiscopo was
not performed.
16Income is measured as per capita GDP, gdp. Values at current prices are con-
verted in real terms with reference to 2000 prices. The cost of health provision is
calculated as the ratio of public health expenditure to income, health. As satisfaction
refers to responsiveness to public policy, other factors that may inﬂuence satisfaction
include demographic characteristics, such as population, pop, the percentage of peo-
ple aged 65 years and over, age65; and the ratio of hospital beds to the population,
beds.
4.3 Results
Although a number of studies on patient satisfaction use multiple linear regressions,
this is generally regarded as inappropriate for ordinal data [Hastie et al., 1989].
Hence, in what follows we adopt a quasi-likelihood analysis which has proved to be a
ﬂexible and tractable approach to the analysis of patient satisfaction data [Preisser,
2003]. Data is analyzed using STATA (Version 10.1, StataCorp, College Station,
TX). Table 3 reports the results.
[Table 3 about here]
Column (1) and column (2) show the coeﬃcient results and the standard devia-
tions of pooled regression,5 where preferences are regressed on the log of per capita
income, controlling for those demographic variables that were found to be signiﬁ-
cant in previous studies. Findings indicate that income is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level and has the expected positive sign. Persons aged 65 and over and the ratio
of hospital beds to the population are both signiﬁcant and display a positive sign,
suggesting that more frequent use, associated with individuals’ age and the existing
supply level, increases satisfaction.
5F-tests are performed on the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for each variable are the same
for each year [Levaggi and Zanola, 2003]. The null hypothesis of equal coeﬃcients could not be
rejected in either cases, therefore data can be pooled.
17To test the link of the ﬁscal cost of provision to satisfaction, we introduce an
additional covariate, namely, the ratio of health expenditure to income. Micro theory
suggests a circular relationship between the income and the health status of an
individual, which can be extended to satisfaction for health services [Farasat et al.,
2007]. This implies that ignoring this source of endogeneity will result in an estimate
that is biased. Hence, health expenditure is used, which is expected to be correlated
with income and not correlated with the error terms. Results and standard deviations
are respectively reported in column (3) and column (4). Under the assumption of
endogeneity, coeﬃcients indicate that (instrumented) per capita income is highly
signiﬁcant and positive and ﬁscal cost (health) is negatively related to preferences
This suggests that welfare losses are higher the greater the opportunity cost of public
provision is, as predicted in the model.
Splitting the sample in two sub-samples, made up respectively by the regions/observations
whose per capita income is lower and higher than the national median income in-
creases the robustness of ﬁndings. Table 4 shows results.
[Table 4 about here]
Again the estimated coeﬃcients show that (instrumented) per capita income is,
in both samples, highly signiﬁcant and positive and ﬁscal cost (health) is negatively
related with satisfaction. This conﬁrms that welfare losses are higher, the lower the
level of income.6
6Just remember that since per capita levels of health expenditure are everywhere very close to
the national average levels due to the standards, their incidence on income becomes higher the
poorer the regions are.
185C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the eﬀective results of de-
centralization. It argues that centralization of standards produces welfare losses,
particularly for the poorer individuals, when preferences for publicly provided goods
are positively correlated with personal income. Centralized standards increase the
opportunity costs for these individuals by forcing them to pay a tax rate higher
than their preferred one. To this extent the argument proposed here does not diﬀer
substantially from the usual argument about welfare costs brought by grants in kind.
The hypothesis has been tested using information on satisfaction provided by
users of the Italian health care system. The statistical analysis conﬁrms that satis-
faction is positively linked to income, and negatively to the opportunity cost. The
authors are aware that the empirical results are still tentative, also because of the
use of average data on satisfaction. Use of individual data, which are not available
at the moment, would provide a ﬁrmer ground to the testing.
Finally, the arguments developed in the paper have important policy implica-
tions questioning the rationale and the cost-eﬀectiveness of policies based on central
standards cum subsidies that are intended to foster the access to services by the
poorer segments of the population. The paper suggests that the same level of sat-
isfaction that is reached with centralized-standards-cum-subsidies could be attained
in decentralized setting with a lower level of spending.
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TABLE 1.     Revenue structure of Italian health care system - 2006  




















Piemonte  1,764  713  40,4  1,051  59,6 
Valle d'Aosta  2,049  775  37,8  1,274  62,2 
Lombardia  1,607  970  60,4  637  39,6 
Bolzano  2,204  887  40,2  1,317  59,8 
Trento  1,866  747  40,0  1,119  60,0 
Veneto  1,692  798  47,2  894  52,8 
Friuli V. G.  1,689  720  42,6  969  57,4 
Liguria  1,828  585  32,0  1,243  68,0 
Emilia R.  1,719  833  48,5  886  51,5 
Toscana  1,706  672  39,4  1,034  60,6 
Umbria  1,661  497  29,9  1,164  70,1 
Marche  1,636  626  38,3  1,010  61,7 
Lazio  1,701  843  49,6  858  50,4 
Abruzzo  1,643  440  26,8  1,203  73,2 
Molise  1,602  199  12,4  1,403  87,6 
Campania  1,544  307  19,9  1,237  80,1 
Puglia  1,589  358  22,5  1,231  77,5 
Basilicata  1,582  177  11,2  1,405  88,8 
Calabria  1,633  153  9,4  1,480  90,6 
Sicilia  1,719  384  22,3  1,335  77,7 
Sardegna  1,566  449  28,7  1,117  71,3 
Italy  1,668  638  38,2  1,030  61,8 
 
Source. Ministero dell’Economia, Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del paese, 2008, Roma.   3
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
score  120 2.9093  1.0358 1.15  5.3333 
gdp  131 18,266.24  4,510.097  11,577.81  25,596.44 
health  131 6.9871  1.5567  3.3313  12.1008 
pop  140 2,896,252  2,301,770  118,879  9,275,230 
age65  139 19.6379  2.9110  13.7156  26.7208 
beds  140 4.9012  2.7809  1.1399  18.2214   22
TABLE 3. Results – Full Sample (2000-2006) 
 








gdp  2.3201* .3845 3.1978*  .5364 
health  - -  -.3033*  .0552 
pop  .0098 .1015  .0227* .0970 
age65  .0603*** .0334 .0589***  .0327 
beds  .1079* .0300 .0999*  .0297 
cons  -21.9706* 2.4405 -28.2812*  4.1449 
 
(1/df) Pearson  .3224  .3131 
BIC -465.0364 -461.6221 
N 111  111 
 
*.**.*** significance at .01, .05, .10 respectively.   23
TABLE 4. Results – Sub-Samples (2000-2006) 
 
 
  Per capita GDP < 18,266.25  Per capita GDP > 18,266.25 








gdp  4.0175* .8803 5.2417* 1.4649 
health  -.3204* .0905 -.7729*  .2615 
pop  -.1654 .1278  -.4165**  .2032 
age65  -.0799 .0517  .0746***  .0454 
beds  .0656 .1276 .0545  .0418 
cons  -30.7851* 7.7789 -39.1019* 11.2919 
 
(1/df) Pearson  .1956  .3314 
BIC -158.9355 -212.5632 
N 49  62 
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